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Kirk Ludwig
Interest in logical form has been driven historically by interest in valid argument forms, 
that is, semantic entailment relations between the premises and conclusion of an argu-
ment underwritten by their semantic forms. The pressure to provide an ever deeper and 
more general account of valid argument forms has led to a generalization of the notion 
of logical form to semantic structure relevant to the evaluation generally of the truth or 
falsity of a sentence.
It is a staple of the tradition since Frege that logical form differs, sometimes dra-
matically, from the surface or superficial grammatical form of a sentence. (We return 
below to whether logical form may be associated with some further level of syntactical 
analysis.) For example, some sentences, like 2 and 3, have multiple readings (“someone 
is loved by everyone” and “everyone is such that there is someone he loves”; “relatives 
who are visiting can be boring” and “it can be boring visiting relatives”) which should 
be assigned different logical forms because the same words contribute differently to 
truth conditions on each. Some sentences with the same superficial form, such as 1 and 
2, 4–6, 9 and 10, 11 and 12, and 13 and 14, are assigned different logical forms because 
they enter into different systematic entailment relations. And some sentences with 
superficially different forms, such as 6–8, are assigned the same logical form because 
they appear to enter into the same systematic entailments. 
 1. Mary loves John
 2. Everyone loves someone
 3. Visiting relatives can be boring
 4. The hearth is warm
 5. The weather is fine
 6. The whale is a mammal
 7. Whales are mammals
 8. Every whale is a mammal
 9. Felix does not bark
10. Pegasus does not exist
11. The president is 6' 1" inches tall
12. The average man is 5' 9" inches tall
13. Jack is a wolf
14. Jack ate a wolf
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In the early analytic tradition, the divergence of surface and logical form was asso-
ciated with a divergence between the form of thoughts and the sentences expressing 
them. Wittgenstein puts this vividly in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ([1921] 1961: 
4.002).
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the 
clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the 
outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but 
for entirely different purposes.
Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the 
External World, defined “philosophical logic” as that portion of logic that concerned the 
study of forms of propositions—or, as he called them, “logical forms.” He claimed that 
some kind of knowledge of logical forms, though with most people it is not 
explicit, is involved in all understanding of discourse. It is the business of philo-
sophical logic to extract this knowledge from its concrete integuments, and to 
render it explicit and pure.
([1914] 1993: 53)
The most famous exemplar of this activity is Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (1905), 
according to which the logical form of “The King of France is bald” is not that of a sub-
ject–predicate sentence (or even a noun phrase + verb phrase construction—we return 
to this divergence later) but a quantificational sentence with internal truth-functional 
structure, “There is a king of France and whatever is a king of France is identical with 
it and it is bald,” in which the grammatical subject of the original is not treated as con-
tributing any entity to the meaning of the sentence, in contrast to, say, “Louis XIV was 
bald” (5, 6, and 12 introduce additional complexities).
In the early twentieth century, especially in the short-lived but influential theory of 
Logical Atomism, logical form was directly connected with metaphysics and the philos-
ophy of mind (Russell [1918–19] 1985; Wittgenstein [1921] 1961). The logical form of 
sentences was taken to reveal both the forms of possible facts or reality and the thoughts 
expressed with them. This interest in logical form is clearly broader than an interest 
in inference patterns among sentences induced by the meanings of logical terms. For 
Russell, for example, a crucial question about logical form was whether belief sentences 
express relations to propositions, a view he held at one point but later rejected (Rus-
sell [1918–19] 1985: 87–8). (Importantly, Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s interest in the 
structure of thought blurs the distinction Davidson drew later between investiga-
tion of logical form and conceptual analysis (Davidson [1980] 2001b: 105–6, [1984] 
2001c: 31).)
Even apart from Logical Atomism, investigation of logical form is an important com-
ponent of what Strawson (1959) called “descriptive metaphysics,” the project of uncov-
ering the ontology embedded in natural languages, what must exist if the sentences 
we endorse are true. Given Quine’s (1948: 33) criterion of ontological commitment, 
according to which “a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the 
bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations 
made in the theory be true,” it follows that one goal of the recovery of logical form is to 
reveal the quantificational commitments of natural language sentences (see Davidson 
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1977; Higginbotham 1993). We will consider a dramatic example below in the event 
analysis of action sentences. 
One response to the divergence of surface and logical form is to treat propositions or 
possible facts as the primary bearers of logical form. Sentences then have the same logi-
cal forms if and only if the propositions or possible facts they express do. This gives us, 
though, only a temporary illusion of progress. As Ayer put it, 
This would be all very well, if we had any means of determining the logical 
forms . . . other than through the grammatical forms of the sentences which 
are used to state them. What happens, in practice, is that we decide, on other 
grounds, which forms of sentences convey this information most perspicuously, 
and that these are not always the grammatical forms in which the sentences are 
originally cast.
(1984: 29–30)
Ayer’s last remark points to a popular way of talking about logical form, according to 
which the logical form of a natural language sentence is the form of a sentence in a 
specially regimented, “ideal,” typically formal language, that translates it—or the forms 
of the sentences that translate it if it is structurally ambiguous (Kalish 1952; Harman 
1972; Audi 1995: 511–12; Sainsbury 2001). These sentences are sometimes said to be, 
and sometimes to give, the logical forms of the originals. The ideal or regimented lan-
guage is to have no ambiguities and to encode in its syntax all differences in the logical 
or semantic roles of terms in them. An interpreted formal language for a first-order logic, 
designed to make shared validity-relevant semantic features correspond to the construc-
tion of a sentence out of its parts, would be an example. Natural language sentences 
have the same form if and only if they are translated by sentences of the regimented 
language of the same form. 
This is not, however, a satisfactory account, for it leaves us with the question of what 
the form of the sentence in the ideal language is (Grandy 1974). If we think of it in 
terms of the pattern of terms in it, perhaps the pattern of logical terms, then this makes 
the notion of logical form relative to the choice the favored language, and there are 
many that would do equally well. Russell’s analysis of “The King of France is bald” can 
be rendered into a standard infix logical notation or into Polish or prefix notation (with 
“f(x)” for “x is a king of France,” “b(x)” for “x is bald,” and “i(x,y)” in prefix notation for 
“x = y”), as in 15 and 16.
 15. (x)((f(x) & (y)(f(y) x = y)) & b(x))
 16. xKKf(x)yCf(y)i(x,y)b(x) 
The logical form of “the king of France is bald” cannot be identified with either, or with 
the patterns of the terms in them, since they are distinct and the choice arbitrary. We 
can only say what the logical form is relative to a system of regimentation. Yet, the origi-
nal and its translations (if they are) share logical form. Sensitivity to this point explains 
why philosophers often talk of such renderings as giving the logical form of the original. 
But this leaves us with the question of what it gives and how it is doing it.
The idea that logical form attaches first to propositions points to a resolution, for 
propositions (in the Frege–Russell tradition) were introduced to be simultaneously 
the objects of thought and the meanings of (declarative) sentences. This suggests 
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looking midway between the sentence and the proposition it expresses to a comprehen-
sive semantic theory that details how words and structures contribute to fixing truth 
conditions for sentences.
An influential suggestion of Donald Davidson’s along these lines is that the notion 
of logical form is best placed in the context of an interpretive truth theory for a natural 
language. 
What should we ask of an adequate account of the logical form of a sentence? 
Above all . . . such an account must lead us to see the semantic character of 
the sentence—its truth or falsity—as owed to how it is composed, by a finite 
number of applications of some of a finite number of devices that suffice for the 
language as a whole, out of elements drawn from a finite stock (the vocabulary) 
that suffices for the language as a whole. To see a sentence in this light is to 
see it in the light of a theory for its language. A way to provide such a theory 
is by recursively characterizing a truth predicate, along the lines suggested by 
Tarski.
(Davidson 1968, [1984] 2001c: 94)
The suggestion in full is that the logical form of a sentence is revealed in the context 
of a compositional meaning theory for the language that takes the form of an interpre-
tive Tarski-style truth theory (Tarski [1934] 1983, 1944; Davidson 1967b, 1970, 1973). 
Restricting attention to a context-insensitive language, an interpretive truth theory for 
an object language L is a finitely axiomatized theory whose axioms provide satisfaction 
conditions for the semantically primitive expressions of the language by using metalan-
guage expressions which translate them. With an adequate logic, the theory will entail 
all sentences of the form (T), where “s” is replaced by a description of a sentence of L as 
constructed out of its semantically primitive components (the need to regiment natural 
language sentences introduces a complication which we return to below) and “p” is 
replaced by a metalanguage sentence that translates it.
(T) s is trueL iff p
In (T), “is trueL” is a metalanguage truth predicate for sentences of L. Given that what 
replaces “p” translates s, we can replace “is trueL iff” with “meansL that” and preserve truth. 
A sentence of the form (T) in which this replacement yields a true sentence we call a T-
sentence and we say that it provides interpretive truth conditions for its object language 
sentence. (The morals developed extend to a language with context-sensitive elements, 
though we cannot take the extension up here. See Lepore and Ludwig 2005: chs. 4–5 for 
more detail and the relation of this way of putting the project to Davidson’s own.)
A canonical proof issues in a T-sentence for s by drawing intuitively only on the con-
tent of the axioms for words in s. The canonical proof of a T-sentence shows the seman-
tic role of each primitive expression in the sentence in fixing its interpretive truth con-
ditions, and in this sense shows what its semantic structure is. According to Davidson’s 
suggestion, this is to know the logical form of the sentence: “To know the logical form 
of a sentence is to know, in the context of a comprehensive theory, the semantical roles 
of the significant features of the sentence” ([1980] 2001a: 146). 
A simple informal theory, A1–A8, stipulated to be interpretive, will illustrate. The 
vocabulary of L consists of the variables, “x,” “x1,” “x2,” . . ., names “Ned” and “Sally,” 
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the one-place predicate “is honest,” the two-place predicate “loves,” the connectives 
“~” and “&” (for negation and conjunction), and an existential quantifier formed 
with parentheses around “” followed by a variable, e.g., “(x).” Square brackets will 
form a structural description of a sentence. Thus, “[Ned loves Sally]” is equivalent to 
“‘Ned’{‘loves’{‘Sally’”—the concatenation of “Ned,” “loves,” and “Sally.” Similarly, 
where “v” and “v'”are metalinguistic variables for variables and names (terms) of L, 
“[v loves v']” is equivalent to “v{‘loves’{v',” etc. ‘iff’ abbreviates “if and only if.” We 
use functions from terms to objects as satisfiers of formulas. Axioms A1–2 specify assign-
ments to names for the functions we quantify over. For any D, [f(D)] refers to the object 
f assigns to D. “I” and “\” take object language formulas as values. 
A1. For any function f, f(“Ned”) = Ned.
A2. For any function f, f(“Sally”) = Sally.
A3. For any function f, term v, f satisfiesL [v is honest] iff f(v) is honest.
A4. For any function f, terms v, v', f satisfiesL [v loves v'] iff f(v) loves f(v').
A5. For any function f, for any formula I, f satisfiesL [~I] iff it is not the case that 
f satisfiesLI.
A6. For any function f, for any formulas I, \, f satisfiesL [I& \] iff f satisfiesLI and f 
satisfiesL \.
A7. For any function f, for any formula I, variable v, f satisfiesL [(v) I] iff for some f' 
such that f' is a v-variant of f, f' satisfiesL I.
A8. For any sentence I, I is trueL iff every function f satisfiesL I.
The satisfaction relation generalizes the ‘true of’ relation. If ‘Ned loves Sally’ is true, 
then ‘loves’ is true of Ned and Sally taken in that order. Thus, a function f that assigns 
Ned to “x” and Sally to “x1” satisfies “x loves x1.” A function f' is a v-variant of f iff f' is 
like f except at most in what it assigns to v. 
A canonical proof is a sequence of metalanguage sentences such that (i) the last 
member is a sentence of the form (T) with no semantic vocabulary on the right hand 
side and (ii) each member of it is an axiom or derived from axioms or previously 
derived sentences by rules applied so as to permit drawing only on the content of the 
axioms. 
Axioms A1–4 are base axioms; axioms A5–7 are recursive axioms. A1–2 are refer-
ence axioms for “Ned” and “Sally.” A3–4 are predicate satisfaction axioms, for one- and 
two-place predicates. A5–6 provide recursive satisfaction conditions for formulas con-
structed with truth-functional connectives. A7 provides recursive satisfaction condi-
tions for quantified formulas. A8 connects satisfaction with truth of closed sentences. 
The form of the axioms may be said to give the role of the object language term in deter-
mining truth conditions of sentences in which it appears and the logico-semantic form 
of the vocabulary item for which it is an axiom. Then the forms of the axioms which 
are used in the proof of a T-sentence for s and how they are employed reveal the logical 
form of s.
A parameter in characterizing semantic form is the classification of axioms. The 
framework allows for various classifications. A natural classification for tracing truth- 
relevant semantic structure is to treat the singular reference axioms as having the same 
form, axioms for predicates with the same number of argument places as having the 
same form, and axioms for distinct truth–functional connectives and distinct quantifiers 
as having the distinct forms. 
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A proof of a T-sentence for [(x)(Ned loves x) & (x1)(x1 loves Sally)] would instan-
tiate A6 for “&” to this sentence. Then we would instantiate A7 for the existential 
quantifier to each of the conjuncts on the right hand side. With A4 for “loves” and 
A1 for “Ned” we can then deduce “For any function f, f satisfies [(x)(Ned loves x)] iff 
some x is such that Ned loves x” and similarly for [(x1)(x1 loves Sally)] with A4 and 
A2. Then instantiating A8 to the sentence, a series of valid substitutions yields the T-
sentence “[(x)(Ned loves x) & (x1)(x1 loves Sally)] is true iff some x is such that Ned 
loves x and some y is such that y loves Sally.” 
What is the point of the exercise? The proof displays the semantic structure of the 
object language sentence in what axioms of what forms are applied at what points in 
arriving at a T-sentence for it. The axioms give the type of contribution of the term for 
which they are axioms, and how they contribute is given by the place in the derivation 
at which it is applied. 
The notion of form we arrive at by this method, as Davidson noted, is relative to 
both the metalanguage and its logic. We seem to face the same problem as we did ear-
lier in identifying logical form with sentences in a particular ideal language. We want 
to abstract away from incidental features of canonical proofs. A suggestion extending 
Davidson’s proposal is to fix sameness of logical form of two sentences in their respec-
tive languages in terms of their admitting of corresponding canonical proofs (Lepore 
and Ludwig 2002b: 67). 
A proof P1 of a T-sentence for s1 in T1 corresponds to a proof P2 for a T-sentence 
for s2 in T2 
iffdf
(a) P1 and P2 are sentence sequences identical in length;
(b) at each stage of each proof identical rules are used;
(c) the base axioms employed at each stage are of the same semantic type, and the 
recursive axioms employed at each stage interpret identically object language 
terms for which they specify satisfaction conditions (with respect to contribu-
tions to truth conditions). 
In terms of this notion, the suggestion is that (loc. cit.)
For any sentences s1, s2, languages L1, L2, s1 in L1 has the same logical form as 
s2 in L2
iffdf
there are interpretive truth theories T1 for L1 and T2 for L2 such that
(a) they share the same logic;
(b) there is a canonical proof P1 of the T-sentence for s1 in T1;
(c) there is a canonical proof P2 of the T-sentence for s2 in T2, such that:
(d) P1 corresponds to P2.
This yields an unrelativized characterization of sameness of logical form. It does not tell 
us what thing the logical form of a sentence is but rather when any two sentences in any 
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languages are the same in logical form. An entity can be introduced using this equiva-
lence relation—the logical form of s1 in L1 = the logical form of s2 in L2 iff s1 in L1 has 
the same logical form as s2 in L2—but this provides no additional insight.
This approach can be extended to imperatives and interrogatives by extending truth-
theoretic semantics to fulfillment-theoretic semantics. Sentences have fulfillment con-
ditions of different sorts: truth conditions for declaratives, and compliance conditions 
for imperatives and interrogatives. Compliance conditions are spelled out recursively 
using the machinery of the truth theory. This is required even for non-declaratives since 
they can appear in molecular sentences, and we can quantify into mood markers: e.g., 
“if you are going to the store, buy some milk,” “Invest every penny you earn.” Then the 
definition of a canonical proof can be generalized to a fulfillment theory, and likewise 
that of a corresponding proof, to generalize the account to nondeclaratives (Lepore and 
Ludwig 2002b: 74–6; Ludwig 2003).
Our illustration elides an important stage in the application to natural languages. 
Minimally, structural ambiguity and syntactic elision that leaves inexplicit aspects of 
how words contribute to truth conditions in natural language sentences require a trans-
lation first into a regimented notation to which the truth theory can be applied (Lycan 
1984: ch.1). Much of the work of uncovering the logical form of natural language 
sentences is expressed in appropriate regimentation. In practice, regimentations draw 
heavily on structures we already know how to incorporate into a truth theory, with the 
attendant danger that familiar structures will prove a Procrustean bed for the original 
(we review an example below). 
Thus, giving a sentence’s logical form with a regimented sentence comes down to 
producing a sentence whose semantic structure is presumed (a) to be well understood 
and (b) to be the same as that of the original. The property indicated, however, is exhib-
ited only in the light of the semantic theory for the regimented sentence.
What are the constraints on regimentation? An interpretive truth theory requires 
that axioms use terms and structures that translate or interpret object language terms 
and structures. The meaning of a term or a structure is a matter of the rules for its 
use, realized in speakers’ linguistic competencies. These involve both the grammar of 
sentences and their interpretation, and are expressed in judgments about grammatical-
ity and entailments and in patterns of usage. Recovering these rules from reflection 
on judgments and observations of usage is constrained (i) by the need to incorporate 
expressions into a comprehensive semantic and syntactic theory for the language, and 
(ii) by the need to take into account the role of pragmatic factors in communica-
tive contexts—for the theory must distinguish responses to sentences based solely on 
meaning and responses based in part on what is pragmatically implied by a speaker 
(Grice 1989: chs. 1–4). There is no simple general way to describe how to do this, 
but two examples will give the flavor of the enterprise and show the power of the 
method.
Return first to Russell’s analysis of ‘The king of France is bald’ in 15, repeated here.
15. (x)((f(x) & (y)(f(y)  x = y)) & b(x))
Evidence for this is that the target sentence appears to be true as a matter of meaning if 
and only if there is a king of France, there is at most one king of France, and whoever 
is king of France is bald. Additional evidence comes from the power of the analysis to 
solve certain puzzles. For example, if 17 is a logical truth, an instance of the law of the 
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excluded middle, how do we avoid the conclusion that it is a logical truth that there is 
a king of France? 
17. The king of France is bald or the king of France is not bald. 
The answer on Russell’s theory is that the second disjunct has two readings, as ‘not’ is 
treated as modifying the predicate (taking narrow scope) or the whole sentence (taking 
wide scope), as shown in 18a and 18b.
18a. (x)((f(x) & (y)(f(y)  x = y)) & ~b(x))
18b. ~(x)((f(x) & (y)(f(y)  x = y)) & b(x))
If we give it the construal in 18a, then 17, though it is committed to there being a king 
of France, is not a logical truth, while if we give it the construal in 18b, it is a logical 
truth but not committed to there being a king of France. “The king of France is not 
bald” is assimilated to “All that glitters is not gold,” which has a true and a false read-
ing as we take “not” to modify “gold” or the whole sentence. “The king of France is not 
bald” then contrasts with “Louis XIV is not bald,” where whether “not” modifies the 
predicate or the whole sentence makes no difference to its evaluation. 
Strawson (1950) objected famously that when there is no king of France, an assertion 
of “The king of France is bald” is not false but lacks a truth value because that there is a 
king of France is a mere presupposition rather than an entailment of it. For when there is 
no king of France, we respond to assertions of “The king of France is bald” not by denying 
it but by saying “There is no king of France.” Against this, we feel no hesitation in saying 
some assertions of sentences containing a nondenoting definite description are false: for 
example, “My father is the present king of France” (Neale 1990: 26–7). The identified 
pattern of response, moreover, can be explained on Russell’s theory together with a theory 
of conversational pragmatics (Grice 1989: chs. 1–4). If one denies that the king of France 
is bald, one will typically be taken to be denying it because one thinks the king of France is 
hirsute, since the point of the sentence is to pick out something to ascribe a property to it, 
and, thus, attention is focused on the predicate. If one denies it because there is no king of 
France or there are two or more, one must be more specific to avoid misunderstanding.
There are other grounds to modify Russell’s account, however. Russell offers a con-
strual in terms of unrestricted quantifiers. The practice goes back to Frege, who rendered 
“All philosophers are rich” as “For all x, if x is a philosopher, x is rich” and “Some phi-
losophers are rich” as “Some x is such that x is a philosopher and x is rich.” This intro-
duction of logical connectives can seem unmotivated from the standpoint of syntax. 
Reflection on related constructions gives substance to this concern and shows the way 
to a resolution. Prima facie, “All philosophers are rich” and “Most philosophers are rich” 
should have the same semantic structure, differing only in the quantificational deter-
miner (Neale 1990: 38–44, 2002). However, “Most philosophers are rich” is not logically 
equivalent to any first-order construal using unrestricted quantifiers (Rescher 1962). It 
is not equivalent to “Most x are such that if x is a philosopher, then x is rich” because 
the original is false, while this is true because most things are not philosophers. It is not 
equivalent to “Most x are such that x is a philosopher and x is rich” because most things 
are neither philosophers nor rich—nor to any other representation using only unre-
stricted quantifiers. “Most philosophers” must be treated a distinct semantic unit, “[Most 
x: x is a philosopher],” which restricts the domain to philosophers and requires most to 
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satisfy the following predicate. But we should then construe “All philosophers are rich” as 
“[All x: x is a philosophers](x is rich)” and “Some philosophers are rich” as “[Some x: x is 
a philosopher](x is rich)” and “The king of France is bald” as “[The x: x is king of France]
(x is bald).” We can thus retain Russell’s quantificational account of definite descrip-
tions without reading any truth functional structure into our understanding of them. 
We see here an example of how regimentation in a familiar notation can distort logico-
semantic form, and how placing the project in the context of a comprehensive semantic 
theory for the language can provide a correction. For further discussion, see Neale 1990, 
Reimer and Bezuidenhout 2004 and Ludlow (Chapter 3.7) in this volume.
Another celebrated example of the discovery of logical form is the event analysis of 
action sentences (Davidson 1967a). The event analysis was introduced to explain the 
semantic function of adverbs of action, and in particular to explain modifier drop entail-
ment. In 20, the action verb is modified by four adverbials; 20 entails each sentence 
obtained by removing one or more of them, and together with 21 entails 22. 
20. Brutus stabbed Caesar [violently] [with a knife] [at the Curia of Pompey] 
[on the ides of March] 
21. Brutus stabbed Caesar only once.
22. Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar was violent, was done with a knife, at the Curia 
of Pompey, on the ides of March.
That these entailments are independent of the particular adverbials and verb shows that 
they are a matter of form (this holds of event verbs generally, and of state verbs that 
admit of adverbial modification). That 20 together with 21 entails 22 is of particular 
interest because 22 contains a description of an event: namely, the event of Brutus’s 
stabbing Caesar, and “was violent,” “was done with a knife,” etc., are predicates of the 
event described. It can scarcely be an accident that variants of these appear in the adver-
bials in 20. Davidson suggested that these entailments fall into a familiar pattern, which 
explains in a uniform way the function of the recurring words in 21–22, if we take 20 to 
involve an implicit existential quantifier over events introduced by the action verb, and 
the adverbials as contributing predicates of events, as in 23 (we set aside tense for this 
abbreviated discussion; see Lepore and Ludwig 2002a for a quantificational treatment).
(e)(stabbing(e, Brutus, Caesar) & violent(e) & with(e, a knife) & at(e, the 
Curia of Pompey) & on(e, the ides of March)).
Modifier drop entailment is then an instance of conjunction elimination in the scope of 
an existential quantifier; 22 is analyzed as in 24, and so “violent,” “with a knife,” etc., are 
exhibited as playing the same semantic role in each of these sentences, and the formal 
entailment of 22 by 20 and 21 is made transparent.
24. [the e: stabbing(e, Brutus, Caesar)](violent(e) & with(e, a knife) & at(e, 
the Curia of Pompey) & on(e, the ides of March))
In a comment on Davidson’s suggestion, Casteñeda suggested separating out the role 
of agent and object (or patient) of the action as separate conjuncts to accommodate 
entailments like those between 25 and 26 on the one hand, and 25 and 27 on the other 
(1967).
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25. He flew the spaceship (e)(agent(e, he) & object(e, the spaceship) & 
 flying(e))
26. He did something (e)(agent(e, he))
27. The spaceship flew (e)(object(e, the spaceship) & flying(e))
This has become a standard feature of the event analysis, now the dominate view of 
the semantics of adverbial modification. (See Ludwig 2010 and Graff Fara and Schein’s 
chapters (2.8 and 3.9) in this volume for further discussion and refinements.)
The event analysis shows vividly the relation between logical form and descriptive 
metaphysics. If the event analysis is correct, then, as we are committed to the truth of 
action sentences, we are committed to the existence of events, though there are no 
overt quantifiers or terms for events in them.
Let us return now to relate this conception of logical form to formally valid argu-
ments. The truth-theoretic (or fulfillment-theoretic) account characterizes logical form 
in terms of semantic structure. In virtue of the meaning of a sentence with a certain 
semantic structure (perhaps on a reading), its truth may require the truth of another, as 
in the case of modifier drop entailment above. Similarly for a set of sentences and one 
or more sentences. The truth theory does not state these relations. However, the logic 
of the truth theory, which is needed to carry out proofs of T-sentences, if fully adequate 
to the meanings of the terms and structures over which it operates, will determine what 
entailments there are based on the forms of sentences. Thus, the truth theory together 
with an adequate logic will provide an account of the formal entailment relations among 
object language sentences.
What is the relation of this to logical validity? An argument is logically valid on 
the standard account if no uniform reinterpretation of its nonlogical elements, holding 
fixed the interpretations of its logical terms, makes its premises true without making its 
conclusion true. Logical validity is therefore relative to a division of terms into logical 
and nonlogical. However, there is no settled view on the correct extension of “logical 
constant.” While there is general agreement on the requirement that logic be topic 
neutral, and on the classification of certain terms, there are various ways of develop-
ing the idea that lead to different extensions. (See Gomez-Torrente 2002 and MacFar-
lane 2010 for an overview.) Consequently, there is no settled view on the extension of 
‘logically valid’. 
However, no matter what the criterion, logical validity, if understood in terms of the 
notion of a logical constant, is narrower than that of formal validity. For example, 28 
entails 29. This is intuitively a formally valid argument, but neither 28 nor 29 contain 
any logical terms. 
28. Brutus is an honorable man
29. Brutus is a man
30. Brutus is honorable and Brutus is a man 
Of course, the representation of the logical form of 28 in 30 contains a logical constant. 
But this is to say that 28 and 30 share logical form on the criterion introduced, not that 
30 contains any logical terms. On this ground, Evans (1976) distinguished between log-
ical and structural consequences. Logical consequences hinge on the presence of logical 
terms, structural consequences on the patterns of types of terms in them. Entailments 
like that from 28 to 29 are structural but not logical. Still, this distinction does not seem 
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significant from the standpoint of semantic theory. That the pattern is created in the 
one case by the use of a term and in the other by arrangement of categories of terms 
seems a matter of what device is used to subserve a purpose. Thus, it seems a matter of 
terminology whether we speak of logical syntax as a semantic structure characterized 
indifferently by a pattern formed partly without or entirely without particular terms, or 
of formally valid arguments, and distinguish them, as Evans does, into those valid in vir-
tue of a pattern created by certain terms, or a pattern created by a structure in the types 
of expressions used (Lepore and Ludwig 2002b: sec. IV and appendix C).
Returning to logical constants, there seems little point in insisting that one of the 
competing criteria in the literature identifies the true coin of logic. Each refines the 
initial observation that there are terms that form salient patterns relevant to valid-
ity. When we are clear about what distinctions each draws, nothing further is revealed 
about the machinery of language by the choice of what terms to bring under the heading 
“logical.” In a comprehensive truth or fulfillment-theoretic account of the language, 
the role of each expression and structure, whether classified as logical or not, is fully 
revealed. The choice lies with the purposes for which the distinction is deployed. 
A final topic is the relation of nonovert levels of syntactic description to logical form. 
The first suggestion of an alignment between the theory of syntax and logical form 
was made by Gilbert Harman (1975), who suggested that deep structure in transforma-
tional grammar could be identified with logical form. More recently, with changes in 
the Chomskian program, it has been suggested that syntactic representations at a level 
called “Logical Form” or “LF,” distinct from surface structure and deep structure, might 
be identified with the logical forms of sentences (Neale 1993). LF is a level of represen-
tation of syntax in Chomskian grammar that provides an interface with a semantics for 
the language in the sense that the LF representation makes explicit whatever is relevant 
to semantic interpretation, such as quantificational structure (May 1985, 1987, 1989). 
This motivates calling it “Logical Form.” 
That there are levels of syntactic representation, how many, and how realized, is an 
empirical issue (many linguists, following Chomsky (1995), now posit only Phonetic 
Form and LF). As usually understood, a level of syntactic representation, distinct from 
surface form, is a psychologically real level of representation by speakers over which 
rules of syntax are defined. It is conceivable that the hypothesis of LF be shown to be 
empirically inadequate. This would not, however, be a reason to say that sentences did 
not have logical form. The notion of the logical form of a sentence, then, is not to be 
analyzed in terms of LF. We can also note that our earlier argument against identifying 
logical form with a sentence in a formal language which makes explicit its semantic 
structure, relative to a semantic theory, applies here as well. Still, LF is clearly relevant 
to logical form. If LF is real, then a psychologically real level of syntactical description 
encodes structural semantic features of sentences. This provides a representation that 
can guide regimentations that serve as input to an interpretive truth theory and an 
important empirical constraint on them (see e.g. Hornstein 2002). Work on LF, then, 
if LF has the relevant properties, will interact in a straightforward way with a theory of 
logical form for natural languages, and vice versa.
Related Topics
1.2 Semantics and Pragmatics
1.8 Compositionality
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1.10 Context-Sensitivity
2.2 Theories of Truth
2.8 Event Semantics
3.4 Quantifiers and Determiners
3.7 Descriptions
3.9 Adverbs
3.11 Indexicals and Demonstratives
4.3 The Role of Psychology
4.6 The Role of Intuitions
4.2 The Role of Linguistics
6.3 The Philosophy of Language for Metaphysics
7.4 Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein.
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